VEREYE PRESS KIT Images free for editorial use with the credit "Image: Vereye". Press contact: Adam@vereye.ai Press kit Everything you need to write the story. The story, the facts with their sources, images free for editorial use, logos and a direct contact. Copy anything on this page. The story What Vereye is, in plain words One line Vereye is an invisible seal that lets anyone check who sealed an image and where a copy no longer matches it, using only the copy. Short version, about 60 words Vereye writes an invisible key into a photo. When a copy is cropped, screenshotted, compressed or edited, Vereye reads the key back without the original, names the registered owner and shows which areas no longer match their registered measurements. On our implementation of the 29 attacks in Google DeepMind’s SynthID-Image paper, at its own size and on 300 photos never used in development, it named the exact owner of 99.7% of attacked copies at typical strength and 95.8% at the most severe, without a single false owner (Google reports 99.96% and 98.84% message recovery for its closed SynthID on its own images). The problem AI-generated images often can no longer be told apart from photographs by eye. At the same time, any picture can be copied, edited and reposted in seconds. The result is a growing loss of trust: fabricated news photos spread faster than corrections, fraud uses fake documents and receipts, photographers and artists see their work reposted without credit, and genuine evidence is waved away as “probably AI”. Why current tools fall short Metadata standards such as C2PA attach provenance to a file, but a screenshot removes it. AI detectors estimate whether an image looks generated, and can be wrong. The watermarks offered by large AI labs mostly answer one question, whether some mark is present, and they are tuned to accept a share of false alarms. None of the ones we know of can prove, from an arbitrary copy, who owns an image and which parts were changed. What Vereye does Vereye seals an image by writing a unique 64-bit key invisibly into its pixels. Anyone can later check a copy. Vereye reads the key from the copy alone, even after cropping, rotation, resizing, compression, screenshots, black and white conversion or perspective changes, and names the registered owner. It then measures the copy against what was registered (the seal, the fine detail and the colour of every area) and marks the areas that no longer match. A copy is called an exact match only when every pixel matches the sealed original. The system uses no machine learning: its exact match and its owner come with computed error bounds rather than a confidence score. The results On our implementation of the 29 attacks in Google DeepMind’s SynthID-Image paper, at its own 512 px size and on 300 photos never used while building it, Vereye identified the exact registered owner of 99.7% of attacked copies at random strength and 95.8% at the most severe strength (Google reports 99.96% and 98.84% message recovery for its closed SynthID on its own images; Vereye’s number is the stricter exact-owner rate). At 1024 px, which is not the protocol’s size, on 100 other held-out photos: 99.9% and 98.9%. Across the 46,467 attacked copies of unmarked images in these benchmarks, Vereye named no owner. On Meta’s Watermark Anything benchmark at native 2K resolution, Vereye recovered the exact key from 99.05% of attacked images with no false alarms, against 71.29% for Meta’s WAM and 66.97% for Adobe’s TrustMark on the same photos (the photos Vereye was tuned on). On our tamper set of 40 photographs, it found 98.5% of edits from the copy alone and flagged no untouched copy. The chance of a false exact match is 1 in 2256 (it would take breaking SHA-512), and the chance of naming a wrong owner is computed at 5.7 × 10−13 per check for a registry of 100 billion images. What it could change Vereye is an early proof of concept of an architecture meant to work as a shared standard. If cameras seal photos at capture and AI generators seal what they produce, anyone could tell real from generated after any number of reposts. Newsrooms could prove that a published photo is unaltered. Photographers and artists could prove ownership of a cropped repost. Film studios could give every screener its own key and trace a leak to its source. Courts, insurers and platforms could check evidence and uploads automatically. The same approach extends to video, audio and documents. About Vereye (boilerplate) Vereye is building a new standard for proving what is real in digital media. Its invisible seal lets anyone verify who sealed an image and where a copy no longer matches it, from the copy alone, with computed bounds on a false exact match and on naming a wrong owner. Vereye was founded by Adam Weisman and Gil Weisman. Patents pending. Contact: Adam@vereye.ai Facts and figures Numbers you can quote 1 in 2256Chance of a false exact match: every pixel is checked against the sealed original with SHA-512, and passing a different image means breaking SHA-512: even a crafted colliding pair takes about 2256 attempts.Pixel fingerprint: SHA-512 (FIPS 180-4) 5.7 × 10−13Chance of naming a wrong owner on one check, computed for a registry of 100 billion images.Source: Vereye paper, 2026 (Section 4.5, under a stated assumption on the 24-bit check) 99.7%Attacked copies whose exact owner was identified on our implementation of the 29 attacks in Google DeepMind’s SynthID-Image paper, at its 512 px on 300 photos never used in development (typical strength; 95.8% at the most severe). Google reports 99.96% and 98.84% message recovery for its closed SynthID on its own images.Measured October 2026; SynthID values reported by Google 0False owners on 46,467 attacked copies of unmarked images.Measured October 2026 99.05%Attacked images whose exact key was recovered on Meta’s Watermark Anything benchmark at native 2K, with no false alarms. Meta’s WAM on the same photos and attacks: 71.29%; Adobe’s TrustMark: 66.97%.Measured October 2026 98.5%Edits found from the copy alone (197 of 200 on 40 photographs). No untouched copy flagged; Meta’s WAM found 81.5%.Measured October 2026 Images Photos and real results, without our framing The eight copies above, also in the “Identified after attack” graphic below, were each read by Vereye’s demo and named the sealed photo’s owner: saved at JPEG quality 30; cropped to 25% of the area; rotated 33° and saved at JPEG quality 85; downscaled to 25% of each side; mirrored, rotated 10° and saved at JPEG quality 75; brightness raised 25% and contrast 30%; shown smaller inside a phone-style screenshot; and pasted at half width into another photo. All images are free for editorial use with the credit “Image: Vereye”. Graphics Downloads Documents and logos Fact sheetPDF · 1 page Story, facts and FAQ as textTXT Research paperPDF Research paper, accessibleWeb page Research paper, taggedAccessible PDF Everything in one fileZIP Logo, whiteSVG Logo, blackSVG Mark onlySVG Wordmark onlySVG FAQ Questions journalists ask Is this an AI detector? No. It does not guess whether an image was generated. It proves who sealed an image and measures where a copy no longer matches it. Once cameras and AI generators seal what they produce, the seal tells real from generated. Can you see the seal? It is designed to be invisible to the eye. On the benchmark images the average change is 41.7 dB PSNR and a colour difference of 1.1 ΔE00, around the threshold of what a trained eye notices side by side. What happens when a copy is cropped, screenshotted or compressed? The key repeats across the whole image, so it can usually still be read from what remains. Every image behaves a little differently depending on its content. How likely is it to name the wrong owner? The probability is computed, not estimated from tests: about 5.7 × 10−13 per check with 100 billion registered images, using the largest number of candidates the reader tried in our tests. In testing, no owner was named on any of 46,467 attacked copies of unmarked images. How does it compare with Google’s SynthID? SynthID scores higher on its own benchmark and is closed, used on images from Google’s generators. Vereye works on any image, is scored on the stricter task of naming the exact owner, and also reports where a copy no longer matches. What does it not do yet? It is an early proof of concept. No watermark, ours included, survives everything: someone set on destroying a seal can, and a full AI regeneration makes a new image. It is not yet engineered for photos of a screen or of a print. A sophisticated attacker might copy a seal onto another picture, but cannot change the registry, which is signed and append-only, and the report shows how far that copy is from the registered photo. Video, audio and documents come next. Is it patented? Patent pending. Contact Press enquiries Adam Weisman, Founder Adam@vereye.ai